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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case is on original proceeding to review
a decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission affirming a decision of the Appeals
Referee that the plaintiff, Wear-Ever Aluminum,
Inc., is liable for contributions to the Unemployment Compensation Fund on monies paid to certain distributors. The question for determination
is whether the distributors are in the employment
of Wear-Ever within the meaning of the Employment Security Act, Section 35-422, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953.
The findings of fact by the Appeals Referee
which were adopted by the Board of Review of
the Industrial Commission present a wholly inadequate foundation for the determination of this
legal issue.* There is no dispute as to the facts,
however, since the evidence presented by the
plaintiff at the hearing of this matter was uncontradicted. For these reasons, reference is made
throughout this Statement of Facts to the record
of testimony at the hearing.
Wear-Ever enters into written agreements
( R. 95) with individuals known as distributors.
By the agreement, the Company appoints them
as distributors to solicit orders for the sale of
its cutlery products from the date of the contract
* Part of Finding No. 4 of the Findings of
Fact is in error in that it is unsupported by evidence in the record. This is detailed below at
p. 18.
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Statement of Facts.

to December 31 of the same year. The contract
is automatically renewed for successive terms of
one year each, unless prior to December 31 of
any year either party notifies the other to the
contrary.
The Company furnishes the distributor with
a suggested price list, but he may and does sell
at higher or lower prices (R. 24, 54, 55, 59, 60,
78, 79) . If the suggested retail price of an item
is $10, the Company will ship the merchandise
for $7 ( R. 95) . If the distributor sells at the suggested price, he has a profit of $3; on the other
hand, if he sells the item for $20, he has a $13
profit; if he sells it for $2, he has a $5 loss ( R.
52-53) . In order to promote sales, the distributor
gives away premiums; he alone fixes the nature
and amount of the premiums; he buys them at
his own expense ( R. 29-30, 55, 80, 92) . Accordingly, the distributor, and not the Company, determines the price at which he sells merchandise
(R. 24).
The Company does not reserve any direction
or control over the activities of the distributors
( R. 95) , and they work entirely for themselves
( R. 39) . The distributor is not required to work
any particular time or for a certain amount of
time ( R. 30, 33) . He solicits as he sees fit ( R.
78, 93) and takes a vacation when he feels like it
( R. 37, 60). In Utah the distributor spends an
average of about 20 to 25% of his time distribut-
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Statement of Facts.

ing Wear-Ever products, from which his average
earnings are about $25 to $27 a month (R. 31, 57,
58, 66) . He makes no written or oral reports ( R.
36-37, 55) . He receives no instructions or directions of any kind ( R. 30-31, 56, 78, 91-92) . He
does not submit his customer lists to the Company
( R. 33, 60) . He does nothing to protect the rights
and interest of the Company ( R. 31) . The distributors may and do sell other merchandise, including merchandise competing with Wear-Ever
(R. 30, 56-57, 64, 82). The distributor is notrequired to do any work whatever (R. 30, 56, 78,
91-93) . He need never be present personally at
any particular time or place, and he gets no additional bonus or financial advantage of any kind
by appearance (R. 36-37, 55, 60, 79-80, 92).
No distributor has any exclusive territory
( R. 34) and a distributor may sell wherever he
chooses (R. 34, 81, 92). No Company policy prevents assignment ( R. 37) ; distributors may and
do have assistants, without Company knowledge
or approval ( R. 25, 55-56, 80-81) . The Company
provides sales kits for distributors which sometimes the distributors buy; if the kits have been
loaned, the distributors return them when they
get through with them ( R. 53) . The distributors
need not use order forms but may send in an
order on any sera p of paper ( R. 36) . The distributor need not submit orders within any certain period of time (R. 68). The distributors are
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Statement of Facts.

not required to meet any quotas of any kind ( R.
33, 60) . The distributor does not collect on accounts ( R. 35) . The Company cannot terminate
the contract of a distributor ( R. 35, 58) .
If the distributor takes money from a customer, he is not required to remit it to the Company ( R. 35-36) . In most cases the customer
makes a down payment to the distributor; the
arrangement is whatever is agreed to between
the distributor and the customer (R. 44). Nothing prevents the distributor from carrying his
own paper on conditional sales agreements (R.
77) . The distributors may and do carry stocks
of merchandise owned by them and shipped to
them by the Company on their orders, and on
which they bear the risk of price fluctuation (R.
25, 32, 60, 79, 92) . While in the majority of sales
the distributors direct the Company to ship merchandise to their customers ( R. 85) , they make
delivery from their own stock of merchandise
direct to the customer whenever they desire ( R.
25, 60, 78, 92) .
The Company does not furnish the distributor
with any office space, desk space, or telephone
(R. 26, 59). He receives no salary or drawing
account ( R. 26, 59) . Distributors may and do
rent their own offices (R. 59). They provide their
own business cards, stationery, advertising, and
transportation facilities, and carry their own insurance (R. 26-27, 29, 59). They are not required

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

Point on Which the Plaintiff Relies.

to keep any .records, repossess merchandise, adjust complaints, or investigate credit ratings (R.
35-36, 60). Substantially all distributors engage
in other gainful activities as they see fit ( R. 31,
56, 64, 80, 82, 91) . Distributors are not subject
to reprimand by the Company for anything at all
(R. 32, 59).
Distributors are not included in the Company
pension plan for employees ( R. 28) . The Company does not withhold income tax on amounts
paid distributors, nor has it ever paid or been
held liable to pay unemployment or Social Security taxes to the federal government or any of
the fifty states in which it operates (R. 28, 30).
The Company has never been held liable for torts
of or workmen's compensation on distributors
( R. 38) . The federal government and twenty-one
states (including nine states with statutes here
identical with Utah) have ruled that the Company
is not liable for unemployment compensation contributions; there have been no adverse rulings
(R. 29).

POINT ON WHICH THE PLAINTIFF RELIES

1. The Wear-Ever distributors do not perform services for the Company for wages.
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Argument.

ARGUMENT
The Wear-Ever Distributors Do Not Perform
Services for the Company for Wages
This case raises the question as to whether
the distributors under contract to Wear-Ever
Aluminum, Inc., are in the employment of WearEver within the meaning of the Employment Security Act, Section 35-4-22, Utah Code Annotated,
1953. That depends, as this Court held in Powell v.
lndu,strial Commission} 116 Utah 385, 210 P. 2d
1006, on "whether there was a 'service relationship' between (the alleged employer) and the several persons who entered in the oral and written
agreements ... If there existed a 'service relationship' the plaintiff was an employer ... When a
service is performed for a person by another for
remuneration . . . a service relationship arises.
Thus true vendor-vendee and lessor-lessee relationships are not service relationships."
The distributors here involved sold WearEver products. There have been six cases, we believe, in which this Court held that the relationship between a particular salesman and a particular manufacturer either was or was not a service relationship.* In Fuller Brush Co. v. Indus*Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Industrial
Commission} 98 Utah 36, 91 P. 2d 512, involved a

salesman, but there was no question but that he
performed services; the only question was
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trial Commission, 99 Utah 97, 104 P. 2d 201, this
Court found a vendor-vendee relationship. On
the other hand, this Court found a service relationship in Creameries of America, Inc., v. Industrial Commission, 98 Utah 571, 102 P. 2d 300;

Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 99 Utah 259, 102 P. 2d 307; Singer
Sewing Machine Co. v. Industrial Commission, 104
Utah 175, 134 P. 2d 479; Northern Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 353, 140 P. 2d 329;
and Leach v. Board of Review, 123 Utah 423, 260
P. 2d 744. The question at bar is whether the
Wear-Ever distributors are like those of Fuller
Bru.sh or like those of Creameries, Salt Lake Tribune, Singer, Northern, and Leach.

At the outset it is clear that this case is not
to be decided by any thought of the "weight of
authority," that is, five cases against one. All
six cases are entirely consistent with each other
and the problem is on which side of the line the
facts in each case fall. As this Court held in
Singer ( 104 Utah at 183), "in every case under
the Act that has been before this Court, we have
steadfastly laid down the same rules and tests."
Accordingly, let us look at the facts of each of the
whether he was to be excluded under Section
19 ( j) ( 5) of the Act. Abrahamsen v. Board of
Review, 3 Utah 2d 289, 283 P. 2d 213, involved
salesmen; however, there was no issue as to the
service relationship, but only as to constitutional
law.
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Argument.
six cases and compare them with those of the case
at bar. This may be done most conveniently, we
believe, by the use of parallel columns.
In Creameries of America, Inc., v. Industrial
Commission, 98 Utah 571, the facts as compared
with the present facts were these:

Creameries

Wear-Ever

''. . . the retail sale price
was fixed by plaintiff
[ the manufacturer ]
(p. 584). This remuneration was the difference between what
Foss had to pay the
company for the products and what he was
permitted to charge
for such products."
"The dealer agreed not
t o h a n d 1 e products
other than those of the
company," (p. 574).

The distributor determines the price at
which he sells merchandise ( R. 24) . He
is furnished a suggested price list, but
may and does sell at
higher or lower prices
( R. 24, 54-55, 59-60,
78-79).
Distributors may and
do sell other merchandise, including mere hand is e competing with Wear-Ever
( R. 30, 56-57).
No distributor has any
exclusive territory (R.

The company granted
to the dealer "the exclusive right to sell its 34).
products at retail in a
defined franchise area''
( p. 574).
The agreement pro- There is no such provivided "for the 'pur- sion in the written
chase' from the dealer, agreement ( R. 95) and
upon the termination there are no side agreeof the contract, of any ments ( R. 24). Dis-
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Argument.
Creameries
customers or business
acquired by the latter
... " ( p. 574) .

Wear-Ever
tributors
quired to
customer
company

are not resubmit their
lists to the
( R. 33, 60).

''The agreement was The company cannot
terminable by either terminate the contract
party upon giving the of a distributor ( R. 35,
other two weeks' writ- 58).
ten notice." ( p. 574) .
''The agreement was not No company policy
assignable without the prevents assignment
written consent of the ( R. 37) . Distributors
company." (p. 574).
may and do have assistants, without company knowledge or approval ( R. 25, 55-56,
80-81).
On the Creameries facts, of course, there was a
service relationship. There the distributor could
handle no other products, and had an exclusive
territory in which he could "resell" only at prices
fixed by the manufacturer. At the termination of
the contract he had to turn over his customers to
the company and go out of business. His remuneration was in an amount fixed by the company, and
for services he had to perform personally.
Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Co. v. Industrial

Commission} 99 Utah 259, is quite similar to
Creameries and quite different from Wear-Ever:
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Argument.
S.alt Lake Tribune
Wear-Ever
The carrier "was, how- The distributor deterever, required to sell mines the price at
the newspapers at a which he sells mercertain fixed price." ( p. chandise ( R. 24) . He is
260).
furnished a suggested
price list, but may and
does sell at higher and
lower prices ( R. 24, 5455, 59-60, 78-79) .
The carrier agreed ''to The distributor is not
deliver said news- required to do any
pa per s and publica- work whatever, or to
tions regularly a n d follow any directions
promptly" ( p. 261) .
or instructions of any
kind (R. 30, 56, 78, 9193).

The contract could be The company cannot
terminated by the com- terminate the contract
pany "with or without of a distributor ( R. 35,
cause, upon 15 days' 58).
notice in writing."
(p. 261)
"Upon termination of Distributors are notrethe contract the circu- quired to submit their
lator was required to customer lists to the
turn over to the com- company ( R. 33, 60) .
pany ... the names and
addresses of all subscribers" ( p. 261) .
Again, the service relationship was evident. The
carrier had to perform the service of delivering
newspapers regularly and promptly, and he had
to charge the subscriber exactly the price fixed
by the company. When an alleged purchaser is
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Argument.

so restricted in his manner of reselling and the
price at which he resells, of course he has not
genuinely made a purchase and resale.
Next we consider Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah 97, which case, we
submit, is indistinguishable from the case at bar
in all material facts:
Fuller Brush

Wear-Ever

"The company suggested retail prices for the
various articles but the
d e a 1 e r was not required to adhere thereto." ( p. 104)

The distributor determines the p r i c e at
which he sells merchandise ( R. 24) . He
is furnished a suggested price list but may
and does sell at higher
and lower prices ( R.
24, 54-55, 59-60, 78-79)
The distributor is not
required to work any
particular time or any
certain amount of time
( R. 30, 33). He solicits
as he sees fit ( R. 78,
93) and takes a vacation when he feels like
it ( R. 37, 60) .
The distributor makes
no written or oral reports ( R. 36-37, 55) .
He receives no instructions or directions ( R.
30-31, 56, 78, 91-92) .

"The dealer set his own
hours of work, the order of work, and methods of work." ( pp. 104105)

"He made no work reports to the company
and received no orders
or directions from it."
(p. 105)

"He made no reports of The distributor makes
s a 1 e s , furnished the no reports ( R. 36-37,
company no list of his 55), and does not sub-
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Argument.
Fuller Brush

customers or record of
his accounts with
them. Any good will
he built up was his
own and not the company's.'' ( p. 105)

Wear-Ever

mit customer lists to
the company ( R. 33,
60). The distributor
does nothing to protect
the rights and interests of the company
(R. 31).
The company provides
sales kits for distributors which sometimes
the distributors buy.
If the kits have been
loaned, the distri butors return them when
they get through. ( R.
43)

The dealers "were supplied with a sample
case of brushes, which
was charged or leased
to them, and which
they c o u 1 d pay for
and keep or return for
credit upon termination of the contract
... " ( p. 104)
The dealer "could sell If the suggested retail
for cash or credit with- price of an item is $10,
out knowledge of the the company will ship
company," (p. 105).
the merchandise for
$7. If the distributor
sells at the suggested
price, he has a profit of
$3. On the other hand,
if the distributor sells
the item for $20, he has
a $13 profit; if he sells
it for $2, he has a $5
loss ( R. 52-53 ) .
The dealers "have a The distributors sell
territory assigned to wherever they choose
them and in which they ( R. 34, 81, 92) , so they
effectuate their sales" are subject to even less
restrictions than the
( p. 104).
Fuller Brush dealers
( R. 89).
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In every respect, therefore, the case at bar
is as good or better on the facts than the case for
Fuller Brush. The holding of this Court, in Fuller
Brush, in which the basic element of the vendorvendee relationship is emphasized, is squarely in
point ( p. 106) :
"Since there was no obligation on plaintiff to
pay claimant any remuneration for services,
but claimant must get his remuneration, if
any, from his ability to sell the brushes at
an advanced price over the cost to him and
that he and not plaintiff assumed the .risk
of profit or loss on the venture or undertaking, it follows claimant's services were not
rendered for wages or under a contract of
hire."
The essential element, the risk of profit or loss
on the venture, is present in the case at bar
from the undisputed testimony that the company
charges the distributor $7 for a particular item
and he may sell it for $2, $10, or $20 ( R. 52, 53) .
In addition, the distributor, in order to promote
sales, usually gives away premiums; he alone
fixes the nature and amount of the premiums; he
buys them at his own expense; and of course the
amount of the premiums affects his profit or loss
( R. 29-30, 55, 80, 92) .
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v.lndustrial Commission, 104 Utah 175, restated the principle of all

these cases and expanded the language of the
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Fuller Brush opinion.* Then this Court showed
that, unlike Fuller J the Singer salesman per-

formed personal services for the Company, "inconsistent with the concept of a vendor-vendee
relationship" ( 104 Utah at p. 194) . These services, quite different from the facts of Wear-Ever,
were these:
Singer

Wear-Ever

" . . . the salesman is The distributor deterauthorized to solicit, mines the price at
negotiate and effect at which he sells merprices and on terms chandise (R. 24). He
approved and author- is furnished a sugized from time to time gested price list, but
by the Company" ( p. may and does sell at
193).
higher and 1 o w e r
prices ( R. 24, 54-55,
59-60, 78-79) .
". . . it authorized him The distributor does
to collect on such Com- not collect on accounts
pany accounts as it ( R. 35).
left or placed in his
hands" ( p. 193) .
". . . salesman make The distributor makes
weekly reports of all no written or oral rebusiness done, and re- ports ( R. 36-37, 55) .
*This Court noted that some other states
have construed their statutes differently. Even
so, it is worth noting that the Company has not
been held liable in any of the fifty states (R. 2829) . This includes Oregon ( R. 29) , whose decision
in a Singer Sewing Machine case this Court expressly approved ( 104 Utah at p. 193).
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Argument.
Singer
Wear-Ever
mit daily all moneys If the distributor takes
collected'' ( p. 193).
money f r o m a customer, he is not required to remit it to
the Company ( R. 3536).
"The salesman must 'do The distributor has no
any act or thing the s u c h obligation ( R.
Company considers 31 ) . Indeed, he is not
necessary or advisable required to do any
for the protection of work whatever or folits interest or ~protec low any directions or
tion of its rights) JJ instructions o f a n y
(Italics by the Court) kind ( R. 30, 56, 78, 91( p. 194).
93).
"The commissions . . . The down payment is
were not deductible by whatever is agreed to
the salesman, but all between the distribumoneys were sent in to tor and the customer
t h e Company" ( p. ( R. 44) ; the distribu194).
tor is not required to
remit money collected
to the Company ( R.
35-36).
". . . in any dispute the There is no such provibooks of the Company sion in the w r i t t e n
shall be binding on the agreement ( R. 95) and
there are no side agreesalesman" ( p. 194) .
ments(R.24).
" . . . his contract was The Company cannot
terminable at the will terminate the contract
of either party." ( p. of a distributor ( R.
178 ) .
35' 58 ) .
Certainly, when the Singer salesman had to do
anything the Company directed, there was a serv-
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Argument.
ice relationship. But your Honors made it clear
that the twofold test was whether the salesman
did "render personal services for another~ and
whether he was "entitled to remuneration
(wages) therefor." To render personal service
for himself, and to be compensated by ''his ability
to sell at an advanced price," does not make a
salesman an employee.

Northern Oil Oo. v. Industrial Commission,
104 Utah 353, so clearly involved a service relationship that it is hard to see why the Company
litigated. The facts are entirely different from
those of Wear-Ever:
Northern
''We are not dealing
here with a definite
form a 1 contract between t h e company
and the solicitors, as
none existed . . . " ( p.
360).

Wear-Ever
The written agreement
between the Company
and its distributors is
in evidence ( R. 95) .
There is no agreement
except in accordance
with the printed form
(R. 24).
" . . . the company was The distributor deterselling its stock at ten mines the price at
cents per share" ( p. which he sells merchandise ( R. 24, 54-55,
361).
59-60' 78-79) .

" . . . the services of The Company cannot
the solicitors could be terminate the contract
terminated without in- of distributor ( R. 35,
curring liabilityn (Ital- 58).
ics by the Court) ( p.
360).
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Northern
The solicitor was allowed "a greater commission when the solicitor w a s personally
present at the consummation of a sale than
was allowed otherwise" ( p. 359) .

Wear-Ever
The distributor need
never be present personally at any particular time or place, and
he gets no additional
bonus or financial advantage of any kind by
appearance (R. 36-37,
55, 60, 79-80, 92).

As your Honors pointed out, the requirement of
personal presence in the Northern case is consistent only with a service relationship.
Last in our review of the cases involving
salesmen is Leach v. Board of Review, 123 Utah
423. The differences between Leach on one hand,
and Fuller Brush and the case at bar on the other,
are readily apparent:

Leach
The Company g i v e s
the dealer "the exclusive right . . . to solicit orders . . . in a
certain terri tory . . .''
( p. 425).
'' . . . at prices fixed by
the plaintiffs [the
Company]" ( p. 425) .

Wear-Ever
No distributor has any
exclusive territory ( R.
34) . The distributors
sell wherever they
choose ( R. 34, 81, 92) .
The distributor determines the p r i c e at
which he sells merchandise ( R. 24, 54-55,
59-60' 78-79 ) .

"The p 1a i n t i f f s [the The distributor need
Company] furnish all not use order forms
order forms and deal- but may send in an orers are required to der on any scrap of
submit all orders . . . paper ( R. 36) . The
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Wear-Ever

Leach
within five days" ( p.
425)
0

"The dealers did not
have legal title to the
products for w h i c h
they obtained orders.
Title reposed in the
plaintiffs'' ( p. 428).

distributor n e e d not
submit orders within any certain period
of time (R. 33).
The distributors may
and do carry stocks of
merchandise owned by
them and shipped to
them by the Company
on their orders, and on
which they bear the
risk of price fl uctuation ( R. 25, 32, 60, 79,
92).

At this point it is worth noting that as to the
amount of stock maintained by a distributor, the
Industrial Commission fell into an error of fact.
The Appeals Referee stated ( R. 8) :
"The distributors did not ordinarily carry a
sizable stock of such paid-for products and
then deliver directly to the customers."
For this statement there is absolutely no support
in the record. The only witnesses who said anything about a stock of merchandise were Smith,
Howells, and Jackson. Smith testified that "a
large proportion of our active distributors carry
stocks of merchandise" ( R. 32) . Howells, asked
if he maintained a stock of merchandise, replied
"Yes" ( R. 55) . Jackson, asked if he had a stock
of merchandise, answered ''I do" ( R. 34) , and
agreed simply that "the majority" of his merchandise sold is delivered by the Company ( R.
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85). None of these statements justifies a conclusion that the stock of merchandise was not "sizable". The record establishes that the distributors
delivered merchandise from their own stock whenever they wanted to do so, in which case, of course,
they had the legal title.
Now in the other cases, solely at their own
option, the distributors had the company make
direct shipments. With respect to these, the Industrial Commission assumed, contrary to the
law, that the distributor could not have had title,
and hence be in a vendor-vendee relationship, simply because he did not personally physically handle the merchandise. This assumption is shown
by the statement of the Appeals Referee ( R. 8) :
"The only time when a distributor had
title to the product was when he paid the
company established price, minus his discount and commission,* and took delivery
himself.''
But is it the law that a distributor cannot have
title because he does not physically handle the
merchandise?
In Middleton v. Evans, 86 Utah 396, 45 P. 2d
570, the plaintiff Middleton had obtained a judgment against the defendant Evans. Evans had
written a book entitled "Joseph Smith, an American Prophet", which was published by the inter*There is no commission; the distributor
simply buys merchandise at a discount ( R. 95) .
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pleaded defendant, MacMillan Company. The
agreement between MacMillan and Evans provided that Evans would purchase 1,000 copies
of his work at the retail price less a 40% discount.
After the book had been published Evans solicited
the Deseret Book Company to buy copies of the
book, and received an order for 300 copies which
he forwarded to MacMillan. Then MacMillan
''shipped said books as ordered directly to the
Deseret Book Company, according to Evans' directions" ( pp. 398-399) . Before Deseret paid anybody for the 300 books MacMillan served a writ of
garnishment on it. The question then was whether
Deseret owed Evans, in which case the garnishment was good, or owed MacMillan, in which case
it was not.
The argument of MacMillan was that Evans
had never received the books because there had
been no personal delivery to him. This Court rejected that argument, holding ( p. 403) :
"If there is any question about the delivery in ths case to the carrier being sufficient
to constitute an unconditional appropriation
to this contract, it will be settled by the fact
that it is a well-established rule that delivery
to a person appointed by the buyer to receive
the goods or to any third person at the buyer's request or with his consent is sufficient
delivery to the buyer. See 55 C. J.p. 364, ~ 357,
note 75; also, Francis v. M erkleyJ 59 Cal. App.
196, 210 P. 437; Fergus County Hardware Co.
v. Crowley) 57 Mont. 340, 188 P. 374; Williamsburgh Stopper Co. v. BickartJ 104 Conn.
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674, 134 A. 233. In the last case it is held
that delivery to the buyer's customers in
accordance with his instructions is delivery
to him.''
Then this Court considered the question of title
and held squarely that title had passed from MacMillan to Evans and from Evans to Deseret ( pp.
405-406) :
"But counsel argues that the Deseret
Book Company is liable or indebted for these
books to whoever was the owner of them immediately prior to the delivery to the Deseret
Book Company. That is true, but if the above
analysis is correct, then when MacMillan
Company delivered the books to the carrier
the title passed to Evans and he became the
owner of them, and wh.en he delivered the
books to the Deseret Book Company the title
passed from him to the Deseret Book Company; so that immediately prior to the delivery to the Deseret Book Company the title
was in Evans. It might be that the delivery
of the books to the carrier by MacMillan Company would be sufficient to pass the property
in the books from MacMillan Company to
Evans and at the same time from Evans to the
Deseret Book Company, even before they
were actually delivered physically to it; but,
in any event, if we are correct in holding that
there was a sale to Evans and a resale by him
to the Deseret Book Company, then even
though one act transferred title it would pass
first from MacMillan Company to Evans and
through him to the Book Company. And the
Deseret Book Company was indebted to
Evans for the purchase price of the books at
the time of the service of this garnishment
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upon it, and the plaintiff was entitled to a
judgment to that effect."
Accordingly, this case establishes, contrary to
the Appeals Referee, that title to merchandise
passes through the distributor who orders it from
the manufacturer and sells it, at such prices as
he sees fit, to his customer. In effect, the distributor has what the stock market would term a "call"
on the company. So, he is assigning to his own
customers for $2, $10, or $20 the merchandise he
is buying from the company for $7. Certainly the
distributor performs no greater "service" for the
company when he orders the company to mail direct than when he takes the article out of his
suitcase. In either event the distributor is buying
and sellin~g and, as this Court said in Fuller Brush,
he must get his remuneration, if any, from his
ability to sell at an advanced price over the cost
to him.
Continuing with the differences between the
Leach dealers and the Wear-Ever distributors:

Leach
The dealers "use the
plaintiffs' office telephone as a reference
in their selling activities and the plain tiffs
provide a table at its
office for the use of the
dealers" ( p. 425) .
"Because the plaintiffs
have sales and instal-

Wear-Ever
The Company does not
furnish the distributor
with any office space,
desk space, or telephone ( R. 25, 59) .

The distributors are
not required to meet
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Wear-Ever

Leach
lation quotas to meet,
the services of dealers
who do not produce
sufficiently are terminated by the plaintiffs.
Only five days' notice
of termination need be
given to the dealers by
the plaintiffs." ( pp.
425-426).

any q u o t a s of any
kind ( R. 33, 60) . The
Company cannot terminate the contract of
a distributor ( R. 35,
58).

And your Honors held that it was ''manifest" that
the dealers were agents because they received a
"commission to be fixed by and in accordance with
a discount or commission schedule maintained by
the [Company] at its office" (p. 429). But in the
case at bar, as in Fuller, the earnings of the distributor equal the price he charges the customer,
less the cost of the merchandise, the premiums he
elects to give, the profits he can realize from the
trade-ins he elects to take, and the expense for
transportation, telephone, and the like that he
thinks it good business to incur.
So much for the cases involving salesmen.
However, there should also be noted one additional case which, while it involved an alleged
lessor-lessee relationship, is the most recent case
before your Honors where the service relationship
was in dispute. Accordingly, we note the facts of

Balt Lake Transportation Co. v. Board of Review,
5 Utah 2d 87, 296 P. 2d 983:
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Salt Lake Transportation
The "plaintiff is the
owner of non-transferable franchises from
the Utah Public Service Commission a n d
from Salt Lake City to
operate taxicabs .
(Italics ours) ( p. 89) .
"Further, the drivers
were required to keep
daily trip sheets, attend safety meetings
The drivers were
not allowed to choose
any shift they might
want . . . " ( p. 89)
0

•

0

0

"

•

"Plaintiff furnished
taxicab stands, ~garage
service, supplied a 11
the n e c e s s a r y oil,
grease and antifreeze
liquids and defrayed
all costs of repairs to
the cabs. It also furnished dispatchers,
switchboard and twoway radio service and
carried liability insurance . . . " ( p. 89 ) .
plaintiff actually
had the right to control the manner and
method of the drivers'

''.

•

0

Wear-Ever
Nothing r e q u i r e s
Wear-Ever to sell direct to the distributor's customers. WearEver i s n o t legally
bound to perform all
selling activities itself.
The distributor makes
no reports ( R. 36-37,
55) . He never need be
present personally at
any particular time or
place ( R. 36-37, 55, 60,
79-80, 92) , and he is
not required to work
a n y particular time
(R. 30, 33).
The company does not
furnish the distributors with any office
space, desk space, or
telephone ( R. 26, 59) .
Distributors provide
t h e i r own business
cards, stationery, advertising, and transport at ion facilities,
and carry their own
insurance (R. 26-27,
29, 59).
The company does not
reserve any direction
or control over the activities of the distrib-
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Salt Lake Transportation

Wear-Ever

activities in perform- utors (R. 95).
ing the services.'' ( p.
91).
''If a driver were acting The distributor is not
in a manner inimical to required to follow any
the interests of plain- directions or instructiff, such as b e i n g tions of any kind ( R.
drunk while on a shift, 30, 56, 78, 91-93) . He
plaintiff could order is not subject to reprihim to report to the mand by the company
garage and they would for anything at all; if
take the car away from he is a "bad actor", the
him, or if the driver company can do nothwere in no condition to ing about it ( R. 32,
safely drive, w o u 1 d 59).
send someone to bring
the cab in . . . " ( p.
91).
"

1"f

.
a d river
re- The company cannot
fused a shift assigned terminate the contract
to him, plaintiff could of a distributor ( R. 35,
refuse to lease to him 58).
any more." ( p. 91).
Certainly, therefore, Salt Lake Trans~portation is
not adverse. Indeed, the function of operating
taxicabs could not legally be assigned to the drivers, and so they did for the company the work it
was required to do. Further, a service relationship could not be denied when the company had
the right to control the manner and method of the
drivers' activities. The very facts on which the
Salt Lake Transportation decision depended establish how different the present case is.
.

•

•
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Faced, then, with the similarity of this case
to the Fuller Brush case and the entire dissimilarity of this case to the others where a service
relationship was found, what is the answer of the
Department of Employment Security? That is
found in the "Comment'' of the Appeals Referee
(R. 10):

". . . it must first be determined whether the
so-called distributors were actually performing a personal service for this employer or
whether they were independent operators
who merely purchased a product from this
company and then resold it independent of
the company.
To assist in making such a determination, the objectives of the company must be
examined. It then becomes obvious, naturally, that the objective of the company was
to sell its products. And to further such objective, the company sales manager for Utah
solicited the services of various individuals
and had them sign the 'distributor agreements.' It is noted that in addition to other
sales provisions, these agreements recite that
such individuals were 'independent contractors' and not employees. However, such language has no bearing on the actual and factual relationship and the facts fall far short
of showing that the so-called distributors
were really independent in the sense of having their own business establishments.
The degree of control over the distributors appears to have been rather limited, but
it still must be considered that they were performing a personal service for the employer.
Furthermore, in this respect, it must be noted
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that the company sales manager did not contact these individuals (prospective distributors) for the purpose of selling the company
product to them. They were solicited for the
purpose of utilizing their services in selling
the company product to the public." (Italics
ours).
In analyzing this ''Comment" of the Appeals Referee, it will be observed that he says that it must
first be determined whether the distributor was
performing a personal service for the Companywhich is true. Then he says that to assist in making the determination, the objective of the Company must be examined and that the objective of
the Company was to sell its products - all of
which is equally true of Fuller Brush and proves
nothing as to the service relationship. Then he
says that the Company "solicited the services of
various individuals"-which of course begs the
entire question as to whether they performed
services!
Following this statement, the Appeals Referee mentions the language of the agreement ( R.
95), which recites that the distributors are independent contractors in their own business, and he
says that this is not conclusive-which is true.
And then he concludes by saying that "it still
must be considered they were performing a personal service." So, except for the unsupported
question-begging statement that the Company
"solicited services," the whole argument of the
Appeals Referee is simply that the distributors
were performing services for the Company be-
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cause the objective of the Company was to sell its
products!
The mere fact that the Company receives
benefit from the services performed by distributors is not determinative of the question whether
such distributors perform service within the
meaning of the Utah law. The test consistently
applied by the Utah court is whether such services are performed for another or for the salesman himself. If the facts show that the service
is rendered for himself and not for an employer,
there is no service relationship, notwithstanding
incidental benefit to the alleged employer. Thus
this court stated in the Fuller Brush case (99
Utah at pp. 105, 103) :
''That claimant performed ·personal service is
not in dispute) but there is a dispute as to
whether such services were performed for
plaintiff or for self and as to whether he received wages therefor or profits on sales.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
But it is not all personal service performed for another that comes within the
act, but only such as is performed 'for wages
or under any contract of hire.' 'Wages) is defined as all compensation payable for personal services J rendered for another under a
contract o.f hire) express or implied. This
compensation is based upon and computed
upon service rendered) and is not derived
from the accomplishment of a purpose or
achievement of an objective, by the person
receivin~g the remuneration, through a difference in two prices. The essential elements
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of wages are that they form a direct obligation against the employer, in favor of the employee; that when the service is performed
the compensation, if any, accrues and becomes payable regardless of the success or
failure of the undertaking; that any profits
or earning over and above costs of the service
accrues to the employer, and any loss as a
result of the undertaking or service must be
borne by the employer." (Italics ours.)
This concept of service h.as been reiterated by this
Court on several occasions, most recently in the
case of Leach v. Board of Review, where this Court
commented upon the Fuller Brush case and noted
that:
'' . . . in selling those brushes they ( the Fuller
Brush salesmen) were rendering service for
themselves and not for the plaintiff company." 123 Utah at p. 429).
In the case at bar, as a matter of fact one of the
Wear-Ever distributors had previously worked as
a Fuller Brush salesman and testified that he was
under less obligation to Wear-Ever in the performance of service than he had been to Fuller
( R. 82, 83) . If the Fuller situation constituted
activity nonservice in character, a fortiori as to
the Wear-Ever situation.
In summary, then, what are the important
benchmarks to determine whether a salesman is
engaged in performing "services" for the manufacturer of the products he sells, or whether the
relationship is nonservice in character:
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( 1) Most important, we think, is whether
the salesman himself fixes the price at which he
sells the merchandise. The manufacturer fixed
the price in every case where a service relationship was found: Creameries} Salt Lake Tribune,
Singer, Northern, and Leach. And the significance
of this fact is emphasized by your Honor's statement in Powell v. Industrial Commission, 116
Utah 385, 210 P. 2d 1006, where a lessor-lessee
relationship was alleged, that
" . . . the miners did not sell the coal they
produced 'because regardless of the fluctuation in the price of coal, the miners received
the same price for the coal they producedone dollar and fifty cents per ton.'"
But in Fuller Brush and Wear-Ever the earnings
of the salesman depend on his ability to sell "at an
advanced price over the cost to him"; the price is
fixed by the salesman. When the salesman fixes
prices, he is selling his own goods, either in his
possession or on which he has a call from the
manufacturer; when the salesman sells at the
manufacturer's price, he is selling the manufacturer's goods.
( 2) If the contract is terminable by the
Company, particularly on· short notice, this is
strong evidence of a service relationship. This
was likewise the situation in every case where a
service relationship was found: Creameries, Salt
Lake Tribune, Singer, Northern, and Leach. But
not in Fuller Brush or Wear-Ever.
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( 3) Restrictions on the activities of the
salesman show that the relationship is of service
rather than that of vendor-vendee. Such restrictions may be that the salesman shall handle no
other products (Creameries, Leach) ; that he shall
make reports (Singer) ; that he shall meet a sales
quota (Leach) ; that he shall work personally,
regularly, promptly, or as directed (Creameries,
Salt Lake Tribune, Singer, Northern); that he
shall surrender his customers' lists (Creameries,
Balt Lake Tribune) . Another restriction, that
he shall work only in a particular area, was noted
in Creameries and Leach, but this was not fatal
to the vendor-vendee relationship in Fuller Brush.
The important thing is that at least one of these
restrictions was present in every case where a
service relationship was found, but Wear-Ever
salesmen are subject to none of them.
Accordingly, we sincerely urge that this
Court hold that on the undisputed facts WearEver distributors did not perform services for the
Company for wages.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID
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